General Munir was trying to convince the US officials that the TTP posed a real threat not only to Pakistan but also to the US. He recalled the involvement of TTP-trained terrorists in a failed bomb attack in Times Square in Manhattan, New York, in 2010. Besides, Pakistani officials also reminded the Americans that the suicide attack that had killed Central Intelligence Agency officers in Afghanistan in 2009 was claimed by TTP.
Pakistan is aware of the fact that in the drone strikes carried out at its behest, the US had decapitated the top leadership of TTP beginning with Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009. Pakistan army would like to see the US once again doing the same on both sides of the Durand line. What hurts the Pakistani security establishment the most is the fact that the US is directly dealing with the Taliban regime, leaving Pakistan in lurch.
However, there was divergence of perception between the US and Pakistan about the threat of violence emanating from Afghanistan. While Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) remained the common threat, the focus of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism effort was to counter resurgent TTP, which it believed was having safe sanctuaries in Afghanistan. From the American point of view, Al Qaeda and ISKP were the two major threats against its interests in the region. According to the US estimates, after the killing of Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, the capability of the outfit had been severely dented.
Besides, the US seemed to be satisfied with the way the Taliban regime was going after ISKP. The US is not relying entirely on the Taliban for its counter-terrorism actions. Since its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US had asserted that it would retain “over the horizon” capabilities to strike at those planning terror attacks against American interests. It had used that capability in Zawahiri’s killing. As of now, the US is unwilling to use the same against TTP for the benefit of Pakistan.
Besides, the US no longer considers TTP a threat. Taking a cue from the Doha agreement of February 2020 between the Taliban and the US, TTP cleverly announced that it had no regional and international agenda. TTP declared that it was only targeting Pakistani security forces seeking implementation of “shariah” in the erstwhile tribal areas. By targeting TTP, the US would not like to create another enemy.Pakistan also doesn’t realise that while TTP is carefully avoiding targeting the US interests, it doesn’t mind attacking Chinese nationals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Why would then the US target an entity that was doing the work that otherwise it would have assigned to CIA? Besides, the US may not approve any ambitious revenge strikes by Pakistan army across the Durand Line, thereby provoking a conflict with the Taliban. The stark reality is that Pakistan doesn’t figure as a country of significant interest for the US anymore. Except for supplying ammunition to Ukraine, Pakistan can’t help the democrat administration in influencing the outcome of the two wars in Ukraine and Gaza that could decide the
fate of the US president Joe Biden’s re-election bid next year.
Caught in the ongoing geostrategic competition between the US and China, Pakistan also remained concerned that the US was relying more on India by supplying it with military hardware and providing intelligence. While the US wanted Pakistan to limit Chinese presence on its soil, China is pushing Pakistan to help it expand its Belt and Road Initiative in the country and connect Kabul also. The visit of the US ambassador to Pakistan, Donald Blome, to Gwadar in Balochistan on September 12 didn’t go down well in Beijing. After all, the port was built with Chinese money for exclusive use by Chinese companies to handle crucial import of oil from the gulf for China’s ever increasing energy requirement. Before expanding their operations further, China wanted security guarantees from the Pakistan army for its nationals.
That was not possible without the US support in terms of drone strikes against TTP and hence the pressing requirement. However, one message that Munir had been successful in conveying to his American interlocutors was that, as in the past, the US could continue doing business with the army irrespective of the outcome of forthcoming general elections. The reality is that elections are unlikely to throw any surprises except if the demoralised young voters of Pakistan Tehreek-eInsaaf comes out in large numbers, even while Imran Khan remained behind bars. That could upset army’s calculations. But that seems to be unlikely.
The army, in no case, would loosen its grip on the country. And hence Pakistan will possibly see another hybrid regime with the army remaining in the driving seat after the elections.
The author is a former Intelligence Bureau officer who served in Pakistan.
